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Abstract There is preliminary evidence, from case re-
ports and investigational studies, to suggest that Deep
Brain Stimulation (DBS) could be used to treat some
patients with Anorexia Nervosa (AN). Although this
research is at an early stage, the invasive nature of the
intervention and the vulnerability of the potential pa-
tients are such that anticipatory ethical analysis is war-
ranted. In this paper, we first show how different treat-
ment mechanisms raise different philosophical and eth-
ical questions. We distinguish three potential mecha-
nisms alluded to in the neuroscientific literature, relating
to desire, control, and emotion, respectively. We explain
why the precise nature of the mechanism has important
implications for the patient’s autonomy and personal
identity. In the second part of the paper, we consider
practical dimensions of offering DBS to patients with
AN in certain cases. We first discuss some limited
circumstances where the mere offering of the interven-
tion might be perceived as exerting a degree of coercive
pressure that could serve to undermine the validity of the
patient’s consent. Finally, we consider the implications
of potential effects of DBS for the authenticity of the
patient’s choice to continue using stimulation to amelio-
rate their condition.
Keywords Deep brain stimulation . Anorexia Nervosa .
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There is some optimism amongst psychiatrists and neu-
roscientists that Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) could be
used effectively in the treatment of Anorexia Nervosa
(AN). Indeed, there is emerging preliminary evidence
from several case reports and investigational studies to
support its effectiveness in some cases [1–4]. Although
attention has been paid to the ethical issues raised by
DBS in general [5], and to the use of non-invasive brain
stimulation techniques for the treatment of eating disor-
ders [6], there has not yet been a detailed analysis of the
philosophical and ethical dimensions of using DBS to
treat patients with AN. The analysis we provide here is
important in a number of respects. Although familiar
ethical concepts re-emerge in our discussion, the range
of potential stimulation sites for DBS generates com-
plexity, whereby some mechanisms have significant
parallels with existing treatment options, whilst others
permit no such comparison. Further, the differences
between the various mechanisms require us to compare
these distinct applications of the very same technology
to evaluate which best promotes the patient’s interests.
AN is a life-threatening psychiatric disorder that is
characterized by compulsive starvation and other
weight loss behaviors, often resulting in severe emacia-
tion, malnutrition and, in the most severe cases, death
[7]. There is no medical consensus on the etiology of
AN, and it is thought to emerge from a complex inter-
action between genetic, psychological and environmen-
tal factors, leading to both neurobiological and behav-
ioral pathologies [8]. AN is notoriously difficult to treat,
with current treatment options demonstrating only
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limited effectiveness. Against this backdrop of impene-
trability, neuroscientists and psychiatrists have begun to
explore the therapeutic prospects offered by techniques
that directly intervene in the brain.
DBS is an invasive neurosurgical procedure that
involves implanting electrodes into a target location of
the patient’s brain. Electrical impulses are sent to the
target location when the pulse generator (often im-
planted subcutaneously below the patient’s clavicle) is
turned on. It is reversible both in the sense that the
stimulation can be turned on or off, and in the sense that
all the implanted components can be removed.
Although trials of DBS as a treatment for AN are still
in early, investigational stages (and may not necessarily
become an approved treatment), the invasive nature of
the intervention and the vulnerability of the potential
patients are such that anticipatory ethical analysis is
warranted. In this paper, we shall first show how differ-
ent treatment mechanisms raise different philosophical
and ethical issues. Which of these potential mechanisms
would promote an AN patient’s ability to direct their life
and express their self in their decisions regarding their
eating behavior, and which might potentially compro-
mise these abilities, is in large part a philosophical
question. We distinguish three potential mechanisms
alluded to in the neuroscientific literature. Having dis-
tinguished these three mechanisms, we explain why
they might have important implications for the patient’s
autonomy and personal identity.
In the second part of the paper, we consider practical
dimensions of offering DBS to patients with AN. Much
of the debate regarding informed consent in this context
has focused on whether severely anorexic patients can
be competent to refuse treatment.Whilst these questions
are undoubtedly important, they are not particular to
consenting to the use of DBS, even though validly
consenting to this treatment might arguably require that
patients meet a higher standard of competence. We shall
not address this question here. Rather, we shall discuss
two potential hazards regarding obtaining valid in-
formed consent specifically to the use of DBS in the
treatment of AN, drawing on our earlier discussion of
the mechanisms involved in the disorder. Although in-
dividual cases will vary depending on the severity of the
illness and the characteristics and expressed wishes of
the patients, we first discuss some limited circumstances
where the mere offering of the intervention might be
perceived as exerting a degree of coercive pressure that
could serve to undermine the validity of the patient’s
consent. Finally, we consider the implications of poten-
tial effects of DBS on a patient’s preferences for the
authenticity of their choice to continue using stimulation
to ameliorate their condition.
Part One: Philosophical Issues Raised
by the Mechanism of Action of DBS
In order to assess the moral challenges raised by the use
of DBS in the treatment of AN, it is important to first
explain how DBS differs from other interventions that
have been used in the context of treating AN. According
to Neil Levy’s ethical parity principle, internal and ex-
ternal interventions into the mind should be treated alike
unless we can identify an ethically relevant difference
between them [9]. In what ways does DBS differ from
existing treatment methods that are employed in the
context of AN? Following Focquaert and Schermer’s
terminology [10], one obvious difference between DBS
and some of the treatment methods used in the context
of AN is that the former involves a direct manipulation
of the subject’s brain, in that it changes the subject’s
thought patterns and behavior by virtue of altering the
subject’s brain structure and function.1 In contrast, other
treatments used in the context of AN such as Cognitive
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and talk therapy are ‘indi-
rect’, in so far as they first seek to change the subject’s
thought patterns and behavior, and can only be said to
alter the subject’s brain structure as result of effecting
these changes.
Of course, the mere fact that DBS is direct and the
other treatment methods mentioned above are indirect
does not itself seem to be an ethically relevant difference
[11]. However, we agree with Focquaert and Schermer
that although the distinction between indirect and direct
interventions is not itself morally relevant, it may none-
theless track a different distinction between, respective-
ly, interventions that require active involvement from
the subject, and interventions that subjects are passive
with respect to [10]. They claim that this distinction is
morally relevant, since direct brain interventions raise
profound philosophical questions relating to personal
identity and the autonomy of the recipients, because
the recipients of such interventions are passive with
1 We do not claim that DBS is the only direct treatment method
used in the context of DBS. For instance, pharmacological agents
may also be direct in this way.
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respect to the changes that they undergo. More specifi-
cally, they claim that direct interventions are problemat-
ic with regards to the subject’s autonomy because the
subject cannot deliberate and selectively endorse or
reject the immediate and radical changes that such in-
terventions bring about.
We broadly agree with this assessment, although we
diverge from it in ways that we shall explain below.
Furthermore, in the context of AN, we may observe that
these issues becomemore complicated still, since we are
considering the effects of such an intervention on an
agent whose identity and apparent goals are to some
extent bound up with their illness [12, 13].
Despite these potential ethical concerns, there is great
interest in using DBS for patients with psychiatric dis-
orders, including treatment-refractory AN, as it offers
several advantages over existing treatment methods [8,
14]. Any intervention affecting feeling, experience, mo-
tivation and behaviour ultimately modifies activity in
the brain. This is true of indirect psychological interven-
tions, such as psychotherapy, as well as direct interven-
tions, such as drugs, surgery or DBS; in some sense,
they all involve the modification of brain states, so
ethical issues raised by one potentially apply to others.
That said, the ‘holy grail’ of neurointervention is precise
control of the activation of single neurons producing
targeted effects. All current interventions are crude
‘blunderbuss’ interventions affecting whole systems or
large areas of the brain. DBS is the closest we currently
get to precise targeting of neuronal activation in the
brain. Indeed, probably the most controversial
neurointervention would be to bring desire under close
cognitive control. Choosing what to desire, and acting
accordingly, would be an enormous power with impli-
cations for freedom, autonomy and well-being.
Although we are not yet at the stage where agents are
enabled to simply will a desire into existence such that it
motivates them sufficiently to act, DBS moves us much
closer to this than we have ever been before. As we shall
explain in the first part of this paper, in the context of
AN, DBS could be used to impose a motivating desire to
eat, or give patients the cognitive control required to
resist compulsive motivation to engage in dangerous
weight loss behavior. Such precise control is made
possible because DBS can be used to selectively mod-
ulate the targeted brain regions proposed to be centrally
involved in the pathophysiology. Moreover, stimulation
can be adjusted according to individual patients’ de-
mands, and stimulation is reversible. It is thus
qualitatively and quantitatively different from most oth-
er neurointerventions and, in particular, deserves special
treatment as ‘proof in principle’ of direct, brain based
desire modification. Of course hypnotherapy, hormonal
castration and many psychiatric interventions aim to
bring desire under control but not under such, direct,
nuanced control.
As we demonstrate below, DBS can have a wide
range of different effects, and it is not clear that existing
treatment methods can exert effects that are comparable
to all of the ones that we describe. The effects that DBS
will bring about depend in part upon the stimulation site
and, correspondingly, the mechanism of action through
which it operates. The scientific literature has suggested
a range of such potential mechanisms. For example, a
review conducted byMcClelland et al. identifies a range
of potential mechanisms:
Although this review reports solely on the effects
of neuromodulation on eating-related behaviours
and resulting weight gain/loss, such changes are
likely to arise as a result of effects to some of the
underlying cognitive, emotional and self-
regulatory aspects of Eating Disorders, such as
cognitive rigidity, impaired decision making, poor
inhibition and altered self-control [15].
Similarly, Nestler outlines different ways in which
improvements in the symptoms and prognosis of AN
patients might be achieved:
The ability of DBS of these regions to induce
some improvement in anorexia nervosa raises the
question of whether such improvements occur
primarily through the alleviation of obsessive-
compulsive or depressive symptoms rather than
the direct alleviation of abnormal feeding behav-
ior. DBS of the subthalamic nucleus, a mainstay in
the treatment of Parkinson’s disease, has been
shown to cause weight gain in a subset of patients,
raising the possibility that this region could be
targeted for anorexia nervosa as well [16]
Understanding the mechanism of DBS will be of
great significance in providing an adequate ethical anal-
ysis of the use of this technology in the context if AN. In
this section, we identify three potential effects of DBS
alluded to in the neuroscientific literature:
1) modification of aberrant reward processing,
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2) increased control over (or reduction of) the drive
towards compulsive behavior, and
3) regulation of aversive mood and affect.
The associated consequences for philosophical as-
sessment are, correspondingly:
1) the imposition or amplification of a desire for food,
2) the promotion of comparative cognitive control
over behavior, and
3) the modification of emotional symptoms or traits.
We shall begin by examining these three mecha-
nisms, before going on to consider their implications
for the patient’s autonomy and personal identity, as well
as explaining how DBS raises ethical issues different
to those raised by existing treatment methods in AN.
Although we broadly agree with Focquaert and
Schermer’s analysis of the morally relevant features of
direct brain interventions, we shall nonetheless suggest
that DBS could be used in the context of AN in amanner
that serves to enhance the subject’s autonomy.
The Imposition or Amplification of Desires: Liking
and Wanting
Park and colleagues explain that a few, single-case
reports on individuals with AN given DBS to the
Nucleus Accumbens (part of the Ventral Striatum direct-
ly implicated in reward processing) suggest positive
outcomes in terms of weight recovery and resolution
of both anorexia and comorbid pathology [8]. Relatedly,
the subthalamic nucleus has also been identified as a
target for the modulation of reward processing [17].
Indeed, as Treasure and Schmidt report:
The importance of the subthalamic nucleus for the
control of eating is shown by the emergence of
binge eating as a possible side-effect of DBS in
that region for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease
[18].
The suggestion seems to be that stimulating a part of
the brain implicated in attributing hedonic properties to
food would increase the appeal of food and/or the mo-
tivation to eat.
In discussing this mechanism, it is important to be
clear on some points of terminology. Park and col-
leagues point out that there is an important – and
neurologically supported – distinction between ‘want-
ing’ and ‘liking’ in AN [8, 19]. Whilst ‘wanting’ is
associated with motivational salience, ‘liking’ simply
denotes hedonic pleasure taken in the object [8].
According to this distinction, if an agent wants some-
thing, they are to some degree motivated to pursue it,
even though this motivation can be overridden by other
competing motivations; however, they need not find it
rewarding. In contrast, if an agent likes something, they
find it rewarding but they need not be motivated to
pursue it. Since rewardingness and motivation usually
go hand in hand, both neurologically and phenomeno-
logically, it does not usually create any conceptual con-
fusion to presume that an agent who finds x rewarding is
also motivated to pursue x. Indeed, in lay discussion, we
often conflate ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ under the umbrella
term of ‘desiring’; if we say that an agent desires x, we
often presume that they both like x, and that they are
motivated to pursue x. However, for reasons elaborated
below, we must be careful not to conflate the hedonic
rewardingness involved in liking with the motivational
salience involved in wanting under the umbrella term of
‘desiring’. This is especially so when discussing the
aberrant neural functioning that can occur in AN.
Where possible, we shall henceforth avoid using the
term ‘desire’ in order to avoid this sort of conflation;
however, we shall occasionally use the term ‘motivating
desire’ to denote ‘wanting’.
It is also illuminating to draw an additional distinc-
tion between the explicit (conscious) and implicit
(subconscious) levels at which wanting and liking can
operate. Park and colleagues note that implicit ‘wanting’
can occur in the absence of cognitively driven, explicit
wanting, or even in conflict with it [8]. For example,
reaction time in a forced-choice procedure can provide
an indirect measure of implicit wanting of food in the
absence of explicit wanting, since our immediate reac-
tions operate at a subconscious rather than conscious
level [20].
The above terminological distinction is important
because Park and colleagues argue that wanting and
liking can cease to work in concert in AN [8]. When
functioning properly, we tend to want (i.e., be motivated
to pursue) things that we like (i.e., find pleasurable). In
contrast, Park and colleagues present evidence to sug-
gest that although the AN patient implicitly wants some
types of food at a subconscious level (indirectly mea-
sured using reaction time in a forced-choice procedure),
there is no explicit or implicit liking of food [8, 20].
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Given the potential for such a disconnect, we should be
careful to note that, according to this conceptualization
of implicit wanting, there is a sense in which the AN
patient can be motivated to pursue (at least at the im-
plicit, subconscious level) something that she does not
like. To explain how the anorexic patient manages this
dissonance, Park and colleagues hypothesise that as
self-starvation increases in AN, controlled processing
amplifies to keep increased implicit ‘wanting’ of unsafe
energy dense foods at bay as these threaten the pursuit of
thinness which is central to AN [8, 21].
Therefore, the seemingly simplistic claim that DBS
could be used to alter a desire for food is, in fact, a
complicated proposition. Whilst increasing the
rewardingness of food could bolster a patient’s motiva-
tion to eat, we should not assume that this will occur at
the explicit, conscious level, nor that increasing implicit
wanting (a subconscious motivating desire, on this
framework) will guarantee that the wanted object will
be liked, that is, experienced as pleasurable. The coun-
terintuitive nature of this disjunction is an artifact of the
aberrant reward processing in the brain of the anorexic
patient. Given this picture, DBS mechanisms that might
be described as simply acting on the patient’s ‘desires’
might in fact function in a number of different ways, and
the precise function might have different implications
for the patient’s autonomy, as we now explain.
Increasing Wanting
First, the intervention could make explicit an otherwise
implicit want, thereby rendering it consciously accessi-
ble to the patient. In a sense, on this understanding, DBS
might be understood to reveal to the patient what she
actually already wants at the subconscious level. On
many plausible accounts of autonomy, whether the pa-
tient identifies with or endorses this motivational desire
(or want) at a higher-order level will be of great signif-
icance to whether the intervention works to promote
their autonomy or frustrate it. On so-called ‘hierarchical’
accounts of autonomy, for an agent to be autonomous
with respect to a motivating desire, they must endorse
that desire with a second order volition that the first
order desire in question be effective in moving them to
act [22]. Alternatively, it might be claimed that autono-
mous agents must, inter alia, rationally endorse their
first-order motivating desires. In turn, an agent can be
said to rationally endorse a motivating desire if they
maintain it on the basis of a belief that the object of that
desire is valuable, or something that it would be good
for them to attain [23–26]. For the purposes of brevity,
we shall henceforth assume this latter, rationalist model.
However, our arguments could readily be translated into
the terms of hierarchical theories.
Sinnott-Armstrong and Pickard have drawn a similar
distinction between wanting and liking in relation to
addiction. They claim that ‘in the case of addiction, the
theory is that addictive wants are triggered by drug-
related cues that have become associated through
sustained, heavy use with consumption’ [27].
However, despite this motivation, ‘some extreme ad-
dicts report no longer liking [gaining pleasure from]
the drugs that they nonetheless want [are motivated to
pursue]’. Indeed, Park and colleagues explicitly com-
pare the AN patient’s behaviors and motivations with
those involved in substance-dependence, where the
mere cues associated with drug taking become associat-
ed with the hedonic properties of craving and taking
drugs [8]. The rewardingness of drug taking essentially
extends (or transfers) to drug related cues such that the
cues are sufficient to motivate drug taking. There is a
sense in which the drug addict is addicted to engaging in
drug taking, not just the drugs themselves. In a similar
way, Park et al. suggest that individuals with AN may
‘start to find that the reward of weight loss is no longer
required as the now habitual weight loss behaviours
themselves and associated cues have become rewarding
or reinforcing’ [8]. The AN patient is ‘addicted’, so to
speak, to engaging in weight loss behaviors, not just the
weight loss itself. In the most extreme cases, weight loss
behaviours will have become so reinforced that they
cease even to be rewarding (liked) even when the AN
patient feels compelled (wants) to persist with them.
However, there are interesting differences between
drug addicts and anorexic patients in relation to the
wanting/linking distinction, which illuminates an impor-
tant consideration for using DBS to, alternatively, gen-
erate a ‘liking’ for food.
Increasing Liking
Consider the case of addiction. It seems that in many
cases, the addict’s initial wanting to take a certain drug is
often generated by the fact that they ‘like’ the hedonic
effects of taking the drug. However, if the comparative
hedonic effects of the drug decrease over time, the
addict may get to the point at which they no longer
‘like’ the substance to which they are addicted, and
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come to form a motivational desire to quit. The problem
for many addicts is that this desire to quit is often not
sufficient to move them to action, often precisely be-
cause it comes into opposition with the more habitual
motivation (i.e., the ‘want’) to seek out the substance to
which they are addicted.
Contrast this to AN. It is not clear why sufferers of
the disease initially start to become motivated to lose
weight. However, it seems that some patients may in
fact endorse their motivation to engage in severe weight
loss, even in the absence of deriving pleasure from
(liking) either the weight loss behaviors, or the weight
loss to which they lead. This can occur when the an-
orexic patient values thinness as an end worth pursuing,
an evaluation that admits of far more complexity than it
being the case that they simply ‘like’ thinness. Once an
addict no longer likes the substance to which they are
addicted, there are rarely further non-hedonic evaluative
grounds for their desire to continue taking the substance
to which they are addicted. Their ‘want’ to nonetheless
continue taking the drug in such a case may plausibly be
understood as compulsive or habitual in a manner that is
inimical to their exerting control over their substance-
taking behavior [27]. In contrast though, the sufferer of
AN often understands herself as having non-hedonic
evaluative grounds for her desire to continue losing
weight, even in the absence of deriving pleasure from
these behaviours.
Relatedly, we can observe that, unlike in addiction, in
AN there is often a goal beyond the compulsive or
habitual behaviors themselves – i.e., that the weight loss
behaviours constitute the carrying out of a long-term
strategy, the aim of which is to become thinner. In
contrast, in the case of addiction, although agents might
use substances to experience pleasure, their substance
use is not usually plausibly described as a strategy
adopted for some independent long-term goal. So,
whilst the AN sufferer pursuing thinness might have
little cause for concern if their weight loss behavior
became habitual in a manner that precluded their taking
pleasure in individual instances of weight losing behav-
ior (in so far as it will help them pursue the end that they
value), it would not make sense for the addict to wel-
come the habituation of substance-use as instrumental
for something they value. Indeed, such a difference
corresponds to the observation made by Godier and
Park that behavioural paradigms have ‘identified nota-
ble distinctions in information processing between AN
and substance dependence [28] reflected in marked
differences in the ability to delay reward in AN as
compared to substance dependence’[29]. Addicts first
and foremost pursue pleasure, whereas the person with
AN often pursues a non-hedonic goal. This is why the
cessation of liking (rewardingness) results in an addict’s
frustration with their continued wanting (motivation) to
use the substance, whilst this might not be true in the
case of the person with AN.
These observations, distinguishing AN from cases of
addiction, illuminate a potential concern with a DBS
mechanismwhich imposes or amplifies the AN patient’s
liking of food. Such a mechanism would make food
more pleasurable, with the intention that the patient
would become more motivated to pursue it;
rewardingness and motivation would again work in
concert. However, it is possible that an increased liking
for food could come into conflict with the anorexic
patient’s evaluative goals, even if the liking itself is not
in direct conflict with another first-order motivation to
engage in weight loss behaviors, or to achieve their
effects. The problem is that the endorsement of being
motivated to lose weight can persist amongst sufferers
of AN even in the absence of their finding weight loss
rewarding. Such patients regard the effects of extreme
weight loss as something that they have reason to pur-
sue, in so far as they believe that being thin is something
that is good for them in a reason-implying sense; we
may call such an assessment a positive rational
evaluation.
We understand a rational evaluation to pertain to an
agent’s apparent reasons, that is, reasons that agents
understand themselves as having given their beliefs;
accordingly, on this definition, an individual’s positive
rational evaluation of x may not track objective facts
about good-making features of x. This is explained by
the fact that a rational evaluation of x will be partly
grounded by P’s beliefs about x. To invoke Parfit’s
terminology in this regard, we may say that P has a
‘merely apparent’ reason to want x, if the beliefs about x
which partly ground her positive evaluation are false
[30]. With this terminology in mind, we may say that a
positive rational evaluation can reflect what an agent has
only a ‘merely apparent’ reason to want. As such, on this
understanding, P may form a positive rational evalua-
tion for x, even if P actually has a strongly decisive
reason to want to avoid x, given the actual facts about x.
We tend to treat positive rational evaluations as
informing our practical deliberations; people want to
live in accordance with what they believe they have
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reasons to do. That is not to say that an agent’s positive
rational evaluations should always be respected; there
may be good reasons not to respect some choices, even
if they are grounded by a positive rational evaluation of
the sort discussed.2 We lack the space to address this
here; however, the important point regarding such eval-
uations for our purposes is that there can be a conflict
between an individual’s positive rational evaluation of
some goal, and what they are in fact motivated to do.
A worry about using DBS in the context of AN is that
it might generate such conflicts; DBS might cause
patients to hold a first-order motivation to eat that is
in conflict with a positive rational evaluation of exces-
sive dieting. Such conflicts are likely to be highly
distressing. Indeed, some of those involved in the
research have warned that ‘Normalization of body
weight after DBS for AN does not necessarily imply
normalization of the distorted body image’ nor other
psychological features associated anorexia [4]. They
worry that DBS may have the consequence of increas-
ing body weight without changing body image, and
that ‘a Bpsychological hell^ for the patient may result
from this’ [4]. Whilst such an outcome has not yet
been reported, the manipulation of first-order desires
without attending to the patient’s evaluation of thin-
ness presents a risk of psychological harm. Of course,
it might be argued that existing indirect therapies could
be used to mitigate the psychological harms associated
with the changes effected by DBS. However, we shall
raise some doubts about this below following our
discussion of authenticity.
Having said this, and contrary to Focquaert and
Schermer’s analysis of direct interventions more gener-
ally, it should be acknowledged that the imposition of a
first-order liking for food could be beneficial for some
AN patients' autonomy on some accounts, including the
rationalist account that we briefly described above. For
instance, suppose that a patient has reached an early
stage of recovery in which they now believe that they
have stronger reasons to ensure their continued survival
than they have to pursue thinness; however, they still
feel the pull of a first-order motivation to avoid food,
and do not feel motivated to begin eating again.
Qualitative interviews have revealed that such conflict
is not an atypical experience, and can create a barrier to
eating. Hope and colleagues describe how some pa-
tients, who had accepted treatment knowing that it
would involve eating larger portions of food, were
nonetheless unable to eat when the food was placed in
front of them [31]. Hope and colleagues suggest that this
inability is due in part to the conflict between a motiva-
tional desire to avoid significant health problems and the
anxiety produced by the prospect of eating. In such
cases, it might be claimed that amplifying a first-order
motivational desire for food could serve to facilitate the
individual’s autonomy by providing her with a first-
order motivating desire that is in alignment with her
rational evaluations.
Promotion of Comparative Cognitive Control
In the previous section, we discussed a potential DBS
mechanism that could amplify either an anorexic pat-
ent’s wanting or liking of food. This mechanism would
seek to increase ‘healthy’ wants or likes that are defi-
cient in the anorexic patient. However, an alternative
hypothesized mechanism is that DBS may aid recovery
by normalizing aberrant control over the compulsive
wants that are characteristic of the disease. Outlining
the neurocircuitry – specifically, a cortico-striatal tha-
lamic circuit (CSTC) – involved, Park and colleagues
explain that research suggests that different neural com-
ponents are responsible for, on the one hand, the
(bottom-up) driving of compulsive wanting behavior
and, on the other hand, the (top-down) control or inhi-
bition of this behavior [8]. Abnormalities in either of
these components (hypoactivity/hyperactivity) may re-
sult in an increase in compulsive behaviours.
Drawing comparisons with the behavior exhibited in
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), Park and col-
leagues hypothesise that anorexic patients might suffer
from hyperactive weight loss compulsion. Although
weight loss behaviors might start out as goal-driven,
these behaviours themselves (as opposed to their effects
on weight) become rewarding and are thereby
2 For instance, if an agent’s positive rational evaluation is based on
a manifestly false belief that is held in an epistemically irrational
manner, that might plausibly give us grounds for not respecting a
choice based on that evaluation. Indeed, although rationalist theo-
ries of autonomy claim that a necessary condition of an agent’s
being autonomous with respect to a motivating desire is that they
rationally endorse the object of that desire, such theories might
also stipulate a further necessary condition of autonomy pertaining
to the epistemic rationality of the beliefs undergirding the agent’s
decision. This a nuanced debate that we cannot explore here;
however, it should be noted that we invoke the concept of a
positive rational evaluation here to highlight the possibility of
psychological harms rather than to make a point about autono-
mous decision-making or what sort of choices should be respected
in the context of AN.
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reinforced until they become habitual motivations.
Consequently, habitual weight loss behavior becomes
dissociated from the original goals and is difficult to
exert control over. Indeed, this hypothesis is borne out in
the experiences of AN patients. Hope and colleagues
use qualitative data to demonstrate how the sense of lack
of control can ‘creep up on’ the AN patient [31]. They
describe how a patient might engage in pathological
weight loss behavior unaware of the dangers, but by
the time they become concerned, they ‘find the behavior
has taken hold’.
Thus, in both the neuroscientific and qualitative dis-
cussions, the argument seems to be that what starts out
as goal-driven becomes habit driven, in a way that is
difficult to resist. Extending the comparison with OCD,
Park and colleagues note that ‘Symptomatic alleviation
in treatment resistant OCD and addictions following
DBS targeted within the CSTC circuit […] supports
the involvement of these circuits in compulsivity.
There are preliminary suggestions that this circuit may
indicate potential targets for DBS for severe enduring
AN’ [8].
We should note that there are therefore two ways in
which comparative cognitive control could be in-
creased: either the compulsive want to diet and avoid
eating could itself be reduced, or the top-down control
over this compulsion could be increased. Consider first
the reduction of the compulsive want. Where the weight
loss behaviors themselves have taken on the rewarding
properties originally associated with successful weight
loss itself, the patient’s inability to cease engaging in
weight loss is principally a result of the strength of the
motivating desire to continue to engage in these behav-
iours; the want is too strong to resist. An intervention
that reduced or inhibited this bottom-up motivation
would essentially ‘down grade’ a compulsive want to a
mere want, which could then be overridden by other
competing motivations (e.g., to survive). Now consider
the increase of top-down control. This mechanism sug-
gests that the aberrant function – the principal factor
leading to compulsive behavior – is a failure of top-
down control. Indeed, Fineberg et al. suggest that fail-
ures in cortical control of fronto-striatal neural circuits
may underpin compulsivity in a number of psychiatric
disorders [32] and Meunier et al. suggest that patients
with related conditions (OCD and substance depen-
dence) show significant impairments in suppressing
ongoing behavior and corresponding significant reduc-
tion of right orbitofrontal connectivity [33]. An
intervention that improved top-down control would
not affect the strong want to engage in weight loss per
se, but the increase in ability to resist may forestall
acting compulsively, such that the want is no longer
effectively compulsive, despite persisting.
To understand the implications of these two mecha-
nisms for the patient’s autonomy, reconsider first the
reduction of the compulsive want. It seems that such
an intervention could promote the patient’s autonomy, if
their weight loss is driven by irresistible reinforced
habits that no longer align with the patient’s autono-
mously chosen goals. Recall the example at the end of
the previous section. We suggested that one way of
facilitating such a patient’s autonomy would be to
impose a motivating desire for food. Suppose now
that the patient in question already had a motivat-
ing desire for food that they rationally endorsed,
but that it was being overridden by a much stron-
ger compulsive motivating desire to avoid eating.
In such a scenario, DBS could be used to reduce
the strength of a compulsive motivating desire
towards the latter over-learnt behaviours, behav-
iours that no longer serve the patient’s goals. The
consequence would be that – having been reduced
in absolute strength – the patient’s motivating de-
sire to engage in weight loss can be overridden by
her motivating desire to survive.
On the other hand, if a patient had formed a positive
rational evaluation of the motivation to engage in weight
loss behaviors, they might not welcome a reduction of
their wanting to do what serves their valued end. On the
contrary, they are likely to object to an intervention that
would reduce the power of a motivational drive that is
highly conducive to their being able to achieve their
goal.
In contrast, it seems that the alternative possibility –
whereby top-down control is increased without affect-
ing the absolute strength of the compulsive motivational
drive – would only serve to promote the agent’s auton-
omy, as it would be up to the agent whether or not to
exert this control. Although themotivational desire itself
is left intact, remedying a failure in top-down cortical
control would give the patient the resources to be more
successfully self-governing, even in the face of strong
drives. The patient regains control over her actions, and
can decide whether or not to resist the motivational
desire. This would be akin to the person who is able to
resist drinking nonetheless choosing to drink in some,
even many, situations. Again, in the context of AN, it
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seems that the use of a direct brain intervention could in
some cases be used to enhance the patient’s autonomy.
Modification of Emotional Symptoms or Traits
The final mechanism we consider is drawn from a study
that examined the effects of using DBS to modify emo-
tional traits of patients with anorexia. Lipsman et al.
believe that anorexia is ‘predominantly a disorder of
emotional processing’ on the grounds that it is, accord-
ing to their model, primarily the limbic structures that
are implicated in the disorder. Anorexia, they point out
is a disorder ‘marked by high rates of depressed mood
and affective dysregulation’ [34].
Lipsman and colleagues stimulated the subcallosal
cingulate, which has a key role in modulating emotional
states and projects cortically, to medial- and
orbitofrontal cortex, as well as subcortically to nucleus
accumbens. They reported as follows:
Our initial study in a small group of treatment-
refractory patients (N.6; average age: 38 years;
average illness duration: 18 years) showed DBS
to be reasonably safe, and associated with im-
provements in comorbid mood and anxiety symp-
toms [34].
Although they found that three of their six patients
had achieved and maintained a BMI greater than their
historical baselines after 9 months, Lipsman and col-
leagues speculated that these effects were achieved in-
directly via a primary effect on mood, anxiety and
affective regulation. Improved mood, they suggest, en-
hanced the uptake and effectiveness of conventional
anorexia treatment, which consequently lead to in-
creases in weight [34].
The plausibility of such a mechanism also corre-
sponds with patient experiences. Interviews conducted
by Hope and colleagues demonstrate the doubly
impairing effects of anxiety on the AN patient’s rational
assessment and on their agency vis-à-vis eating [31].
With respect to beliefs and decision-making, Hope et al.
show how aversive affective responses to body size lead
the patient to discount the objective evidence of low
weight, such that beliefs grounded on this evidence are
not given the appropriate epistemic weight. The high
levels of anxiety generated by seeing her body, and not
the direct perception of it, ‘tell’ the AN patient that she is
fat.
Anxiety also impairs agency; it makes it very difficult
for the patient to eat in the same way that arthritis makes
it difficult for an arthritic man to walk, even though there
is a sense in which he can. Hope and colleagues there-
fore conclude that
[E]ating to put on weight is also very diffi-
cult because of the extreme anxiety and feel-
ings of self-disgust that accompany the intake
of food, particularly intake that is perceived
as excessive. This anxiety is not only un-
pleasant in itself, but also gives the message
that eating, and weight gain, are dangerous
[31].
An intervention that reduces anxiety and other aver-
sive affect leaves the patient’s drives and desires less
directly affected, although there is plausibly a relation-
ship between how we feel and what we are motivated to
do. In cases where the intervention acts on an agent’s
mood and emotions, the interventionmay raise concerns
pertaining to the patient’s narrative identity, that is the
qualitative sense of identity that we invoke when we
discuss the continuity of a person’s character over time
[35].
Whilst it seems intuitively plausible to claim that
raised mood and decreased anxiety are the sorts of
changes that people will welcome, mood and emo-
tions can be closely bound up with our sense of
qualitative identity in ways that clinicians should at
least be aware of. The following quotation from a
study conducted by Tan et al. illustrates this in
relation to AN [12]:
Interviewer: If your anorexia nervosa magically
disappeared, what would be different from right
now?
Participant: Everything. My personality would be
different.
Interviewer: Really!
Participant: It’s been, I know it’s been such a big
part of me, and—I don’t think you can ever get rid
of it, or the feelings, you always have a bit—in
you. […]
Interviewer: Let’s say you’ve got to this point, and
someone said they could wave a magic wand and
there wouldn’t be anorexia any more.
Participant: I couldn’t.
Interviewer: You couldn’t.
Participant: It’s just a part of me now.
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Interviewer: Right. So it feels like you’d be losing
a part of you.
Participant: Because it was my identity. (Partici-
pant I).
Thus, the AN patient’s anxiety and associated false
beliefs about body image can become central to their
sense of identity. Whilst this does not provide an all
things considered argument against a treatment that
modifies affect, the possibility that the patient may
experience herself as undergoing significant change
should at least be brought to her attention in the process
of obtaining consent.
We pointed out above that Wu et al. warn against
the ‘psychological hell’ that DBS might expose an-
orexic patients to, and suggested that it might be
argued that existing indirect therapies could be used
to mitigate these psychological harms. However,
considerations of authenticity give us reason to be-
lieve that indirect therapies may offer only limited
mitigation of the harms discussed here; if DBS
brings about a change in the patient’s qualitative
identity, even if indirect therapies may help the
patient come to terms with this change after it oc-
curs, they will not serve to bring back the patient’s
sense of identity that was once so important to them.
Instead, such therapies rely on the active involve-
ment with who the patient is now, in a qualitative
sense. Furthermore, even if these harms could plau-
sibly be mitigated, we surely have some moral rea-
son to employ DBS in a way that avoids such
psychological harms if possible, rather than seek to
mitigate them once they have occurred.
The use of DBS to reduce anxiety prompts relevant
comparisons with using antidepressants or anti-anxiety
medications. To a large extent, the ethical issues associ-
ated with this particular mechanism – especially those
associated with authenticity – are not unique to DBS,
since these pharmacological agents also amount to di-
rect interventions. For example, philosophers have de-
bated whether taking the drug Prozac to treat depression
would promote or diminish the authenticity of the
agent’s experiences [36].
In contrast, there is little precedent in the context of
AN with which to draw comparisons concerning the
direct amplification a desire for food, nor the direct
increase of comparative control over compulsive weight
loss behaviors. Thus, DBS raises unique issues associ-
ated with the potential mechanisms and effects in these
cases and, perhaps more saliently, raises the broader
issue of how we should choose between these mecha-
nisms. Whilst relative effectiveness, in the sense of
promoting weight gain, will be a significant consider-
ation when opting to implement one mechanism instead
of another, the likely effects on the patient’s sense of
identity and their ability to be self-governing should also
factor into the clinician-patient decision.
For example, as we discussed above, a mecha-
nism that increases the patient’s capacity for top-
down cognitive control over compulsive behaviours
would be a paradigm example of an intervention that
increases the recipient’s capacity for autonomous
decision-making, even though it is brought about
via a direct intervention. Similarly, a mechanism that
modula tes af fec t in the way tha t DBS is
hypothesised to do may sometimes promote auton-
omy; by reducing the anxiety which sometimes pre-
vents patients from assigning the correct epistemic
weight to facts about their low weight, and from
engaging in healthier eating behaviours [31] . To
the extent that this is the case, the voluntary decision
to undergo DBS could also constitute a paradigm
instance of someone living authentically, in line with
the existentialist view, according to which living
authentically is to consciously shape one’s own
characteristics.
Although there are clearly ways in which DBS is able
to increase the patient’s capacity for autonomous deci-
sion-making, this will not necessarily be the case. For
example, it may be detrimental to alter bottom-up mo-
tivating desires that were not endorsed by the patient at a
higher-order level. Thus, even where the specifics of
some individual mechanisms invoke familiar ethical
deba tes , the dec i s ion abou t which s i t e i s
all things considered the best to target requires new
comparisons, which encompass the physical effects, as
well as the mechanism-specific effects on the patient’s
ability to be self-governing.
Part Two: Obtaining Valid Consent and Assessing
Patient Competence
Perceived Coercion and Validity of Consent to Undergo
DBS
Much of the ethical debate surrounding the treatment of
AN has focused on the question of whether anorexic
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patients are competent to refuse treatment, and whether
their right to refuse treatment should be respected [12,
13, 23, 37–44]. We lack the space to settle these ques-
tions here. Instead, we shall assume that AN patients can
be competent to refuse treatment, and suggest that giv-
ing a competent, severely anorexic patient the option of
treatment in the form of DBS could still present ethical
problems regarding consent if appropriate safeguards
are not put in place. We shall consider two problems;
the first relates to the potential for coerced choice, the
second relates to the authenticity of the patient’s choice
to continue using DBS after it may already have affected
her evaluative judgments.
Perceived Coercion
In limited cases, severely anorexic patients are subjected
to involuntary force-feeding; although this is an invasive
and potentially traumatic procedure, it is sometimes
necessary to prevent the patient’s death. Subjecting an
AN patient to involuntary force-feeding amounts to
compulsion in Feinberg’s sense of the term, where com-
pulsion is understood to amount to exerting direct force
to make a particular option impossible [45]. Although
compulsory force-feeding is sometimes permitted, there
are good reasons for supposing that compulsory DBS
would not be similarly permitted; it is more invasive,
riskier and poses a greater threat to the mental life of the
patient.
Compelling a competent patient to undergo involun-
tary force-feeding violates their autonomy in an obvious
way. Moreover, even if the patient was incompetent, it
could be a distressing and terrifying event associated
with significant harm (though arguably necessary to
save life).
Accordingly, it seems that the most plausible way in
which DBS treatment might be incorporated into the
care of AN patients is as a voluntary alternative to other
treatments. However, a potential problem with this is
that a patient’s belief in the possibility of being subjected
to involuntary treatments such as force-feeding may
have more subtle effects on the validity of their consent
to undergo other treatments. To see why, we may begin
by contrasting the compulsion involved in force-feeding
with Feinberg’s understanding of coercion; for
Feinberg, coercion does not make an option impossible
(as is the case in compulsion), but rather destroys its
appeal by increasing its cost [45]. A paradigm case is
that of the highway-man who tells their victim that he
will shoot them unless they hand over their wallet. The
victim here is coerced; although it is possible for him not
to hand over his wallet, this option lacks the appeal it
once had by virtue of the fact that there are now large
costs associated with taking that option. Crucially for
our purposes here, coercion is commonly understood to
invalidate consent [46].
With this in mind, we might notice that if a patient
believes (rightly or wrongly) that there is a credible
threat of being subjected to involuntary force-feeding
if they do not agree to some other therapeutic interven-
tion, then they may consent to the latter intervention
only because they strongly want to avoid the former.
This, however, bears the hallmarks of coercion. Indeed,
Tan’s studies have suggested that AN patients often
perceive themselves as being coerced in this way as a
part of their treatment. Consider the following reports
from another of Tan’s studies [47], which addressed
anorexic patients’ attitudes towards forced treatment:
I was meant to go as an inpatient at the P [adoles-
cent general psychiatric unit] about 2 years ago,
but I didn’t want to, and so I did the treatment at
home. And I didn’t really think I had a choice
[about whether to have treatment], looking back
on it now I think: BWell, why didn’t I just not eat?^
And I didn’t want to, but I still did it because I
thought I didn’t have a choice. So in a way that
was sort of forced upon me, I didn’t want to get
better then. 19P
I mean I came, technically I came in here volun-
tarily, and technically I suppose it wasmy decision
…but it doesn’t always feel like that when there’s
a lot of pressure and a lot of guilt, that’s played a
big part in it. And personally I was just left feeling
that…there really was no other choice. 39P
Arguably then, it may be the case that coercive
pressure is sometimes placed on competent patients’
choices in this sort of manner [13, 48, 49]. Having said
this, and although we lack the space to further develop
the thought here, prima facie, it seems that invalidating a
patient’s consent by placing such coercive pressure on a
patient’s choice is morally preferable to subjecting her to
involuntary treatment; the use of compulsion, it seems,
may plausibly involve further moral wrongs that the use
of coercion does not.
We have suggested that even if AN patients are
sometimes compelled to undergo involuntary force-
feeding, there are good reasons not to compel patients
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to undergo involuntary DBS treatment. Accordingly, it
seems that the most plausible way in which DBS treat-
ment might be incorporated into the care of AN patients
is as a voluntary alternative to other treatments.
However, the above discussion should make it clear that
this may not be sufficient to dispell all of the potential
concerns regarding patient autonomy and informed con-
sent in this context. The problem is that if the patient
justifiably or even falsely believes that a failure to give
consent to DBS will result in doctors resorting to invol-
untary force-feeding further down the line, they might
opt for the neurosurgical intervention in order to avoid
the trauma of involuntary force-feeding. However,
whilst we may be prepared to allow the coercion of
AN patients to get them to enter into existing treatment
programmes, it is not clear that our moral reasons here
will be powerful enough to justify coercing patients to
undergo a riskier and deeply invasive procedure such as
DBS.
In response to this observation, it might be claimed
that patients would not feel coerced to undergo DBS in
this way because they would also be given the option of
choosing to eat before being offered the options of
choosing to undergo DBS or being force-fed. Offering
DBS, it might be claimed, should be a last resort before
compelling force-feeding.
Yet, it is not clear that this approach would be suffi-
cient to dispel the concern that we are raising. The
problem with it is that the anorexic patient may believe
that undergoing DBS is preferable to actually eating
food, because they may be under the impression that
they will be able to continue resisting any new or en-
hanced urges to eat. Consider the following, again from
Tan’s study:
Interviewer: What do you think about being ad-
mitted to hospital for treatment against your will?
Participant: If I didn’t want to, if I was really
really in my losing weight frame of mind, it’s the
last thing I would want to be doing; and I don’t
think it would be very successful because I’d be
fighting against it.
A patient’s ability to ‘fight’ against their treatment
depends a great deal on the particular treatment in ques-
tion. Whilst a patient may correctly believe that she can
fight against her doctors by refusing to engage with
indirect treatments that require her active involvement,
it is less clear that a patient is correct to believe that she
can be successful in fighting against forced feeding. The
key question for our purposes here is what the anorexic
patient is likely to believe about their ability to ‘fight’
against the changes that a direct intervention such as
DBS would precipitate – if they believe that they are
able to ‘fight’ mentally against it in a manner that they
are unable to fight physically against force-feeding, they
may think that DBS treatment is preferable to consum-
ing food, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. The rea-
son for this is that both of these latter options directly
frustrate the anorexic patient’s central desire to refrain
from eating. Whilst the patient may be correct to believe
that DBS would not have this direct effect, she may not
adequately attend to the power of the urges that DBS
might bring about, or to the other morally relevant
aspects of the treatment that must be sufficiently under-
stood if her consent to the treatment is to be truly valid.
At very least, a full explanation of the potential manner
in which DBS might act in AN is necessary for the
patient’s consent to be valid.
As such, it seems that there are some plausible
grounds for the concern that patients may perceive that
coercive pressure is being placed on their choice, wheth-
er or not such pressure is being intentionally applied.
This is arguably problematic with regard to the quality
of their consent to undergoing the procedure, since their
decision is made in the perceived context of a ‘forced
choice’, or coercion, and this may be understood to
invalidate consent. Whilst we do not claim that it is
impossible to autonomously consent to DBS for AN,
we raise this concern as one that should be considered in
cases where patients might be likely to perceive the
situation as less than fully free. Patients might ideally
want to forgo both food and DBS, and not be force-fed.
But that option might not be available; and whilst non-
consensual force-feeding may already be permitted in
some limited cases, there are good reasons for refraining
from using DBS in the absence of valid consent.
Having said that, there may be ways in which we
might mitigate these concerns. First, we might only
allow the use of DBS following an independent treat-
ment review; part of the review panel’s role could be to
clarify for the patient that they are not being coerced into
accepting treatment. One way in which the patient might
be assured of this is to ensure that they understand that
the option of force-feeding will not be taken. If medical
professionals undertook not to force-feed, even to save
life, then the perception that this would be done if DBS
was not accepted would be removed. Thus,
226 H. Maslen et al.
paradoxically, DBS might be most ethical in contexts
where force-feeding is not a possibility.
Reversibility, Authenticity and Shared
Decision-Making
One notable feature of DBS is that it would be possible
to give patients control over their stimulation – whether
to continue it and how to fine-tune it – in consultation
with their physician. On the face of it, this is
empowering; patients control their treatment.
However, we should not simply assume that this en-
hances authenticity or respects autonomy. Stimulation,
as we discussed, could be used to impose a change that
is inauthentic. The mere fact that an agent finds some-
thing rewarding and pursues it on this basis, does not
guarantee that she values or rationally endorses it.
Reward can generate strong motivation, and the fact
that a person continues to stimulate a part of the brain
implicated in reward does not necessarily mean that the
choice is an expression of reflection, deep-seated values,
or that agent’s authentic self.
To illustrate the problem in the context of AN, sup-
pose that an anorexic patient validly consents to under-
going DBS. Whilst she is experiencing the effects of the
stimulation, suppose that she embraces the change in
desires that the stimulation precipitates, and tells her
care team that she endorses the changes, and would like
to undergo further stimulation in the future. However,
when stimulation is stopped and the effects wear off, she
is horrified by the changes that occurred whilst she was
experiencing the effects of stimulation, and withdraws
her consent to continue treatment.3
This possibility adds a further layer of uncertainty to
existing difficulties in determining the authentic wishes
of the AN patient. Hope and colleagues provide quali-
tative evidence to show that AN patients often experi-
ence a ‘shifting between mind sets’ [31]: in one mind
set, the patient has a set of beliefs, goals and affective
states that she sees as directing her to eat more and gain
weight. In the other mindset, the patient panics and feels
she is not able to eat to put on weight. In this mindset,
she may not even be sure that to be healthy she needs to
gain weight. Thus, there is an instability and ambiva-
lence that leads us to question whether one of the two
‘mindsets’ can be identified as the one that should be
respected, as the ‘authentic’ self, or perhaps neither, or
even elements of both. The possibility of adding a
further ‘self’ (the ‘stimulated self’) to compete for au-
thenticity renders determination of which preference to
respect even more difficult.
However, although we do not have the space to
develop a detailed position here, we would in fact op-
pose practical employment of the concept of authentic
selves in such contexts –with the associated assumption
that one self is the ‘true’ self – recommending instead
that physicians consider the pattern and stability of an
agent’s preferences over time, both on and off stimula-
tion. Such a diachronic approach avoids the automatic
prioritization of preferences under treatment.
Indeed, it might be tempting to suppose that we
should respect the wish to continue treatment that the
patient expressed when she was under the influence of
DBS. In support of this claim, it might be argued that the
desires that underlie the patient’s choice to now refuse
treatment (i.e., in the absence of the effects of DBS)
have a ‘pathological origin’, and do not reflect what the
agent authentically desires. For instance, Tan and col-
leagues have suggested that the paramount importance
that anorexic patients place on thinness can be under-
stood to be pathological in so far as this sort of evalua-
tion is closely identified with the diagnostic criteria of
AN [12].
However, it seems that this claim requires further
support. As Craigie notes, Tan et al.’s proposal seems
in some way to beg the question; after all, the inclusion
of this sort of evaluation in the diagnostic criteria of AN
itself seems to presuppose that the evaluation is patho-
logical [23]. In the absence of further justification of
why the anorexic patient’s desire to refuse treatment is
inauthentic, physicians should not make the substantive
claim that only a patient’s desire to continue treatment is
authentic. Whilst a patient might express this sort of
desire under the influence of DBS, we should be wary
that this technology can have profound effects on pa-
tient’s drives, emotions and values. Yet it is possible that
the changes that the stimulation brings about may alien-
ate the agent from what one authentic self rationally
endorses. This raises deep questions about the nature
of competence to consent and authenticity; does the
patient reveal what she authentically wants when she
is under the influence of DBS, when she is not under the
influence of DBS, or neither? Must valid consent be
based on an authentic desire?
We cannot adequately address these questions here,
and can again only gesture towards an account that does3 This scenario has been raised elsewhere [5].
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not identify distinct selves, but looks at the patient’s
preferences and values over time. It is imperative that
physicians encourage patients to reflect on the changes
both when ‘on’ and ‘off’ stimulation to better determine
whether the patient embraces them as authentic over
time. If we believe that the use of DBS is only permis-
sible with the valid consent of the patient, we must
answer these deeper questions about consent and au-
thenticity, and not merely make the substantive pre-
sumption that the patient must always ‘really’ want to
get better, and that we should only take into account the
patient’s expression of this desire.
Conclusion
DBS is undoubtedly a powerful new medical technolo-
gy, and existing studies suggests that it has at least some
promise as a potential new therapy for AN. Further, as
we have demonstrated, DBS raises a novel ethical issue
in this context in so far as we must choose between
implementing various mechanisms of the very same
technology, a choice that requires reflection not just on
their relative effectiveness at promoting weight gain, but
also on their implications for the patient’s ability to
govern herself.
Of course, a comprehensive ethical analysis of the
use of this technology should focus first on the quality of
the patient’s consent to undergo the intervention. In this
paper, we have assumed, for the sake of discussion, that
the AN patient could be competent with respect to their
decision to accept (or refuse) treatment, and that these
decisions should be respected. It is worth noting that this
is a somewhat controversial assumption in this context;
however, by making this assumption, we have been able
to explore further ethical considerations that are specific
to the use of DBS to treat AN. It also requires us to
compare potential target sites along a number of ethical-
ly relevant dimensions.
We have suggested that whilst the way in which DBS
manipulates various neural processes might plausibly
enhance the patient’s ability to make autonomous deci-
sions with regards to her eating behavior, the use of this
technology to alter first-order motivating desires or the
patient’s emotional traits may confer significant harms
as well as potential benefits. The various ways in which
different mechanisms are likely to affect AN patients’
experiences of themselves, and their ability to be self-
governing must be borne in mind in research and
clinical development protocols for DBS treatment.
Furthermore, practitioners should be wary of the new
ways in which the use (and indeed, mere prospect) of
DBS treatment could introduce new avenues of per-
ceived coercion, and new problems regarding the au-
thenticity of AN patients’ desires regarding their contin-
ued treatment and eating behaviors.
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